INCE 1980 all depository institutions have been required to hold reserve balances in the form of Treasuiy coins and Federal Reserve notes either in their own vaults or on deposit at their regional Federal Reserve Banks. These reserve balances pay no interest, so the foregone interest earnings on the investments the firm could otherwise have made can be viewed as a tax.' This tax lowers the firm's expected stream of future income net of taxes which, other things the same, reduces the capital value of the firm. The tax varies with the general level of interest rates as well as the spread between bank lending and borrowing rates. Prior to 1980, the tax had differential effects across banks depending on the tax rate required reserve ratio) faced by these various firms. This was particularly true with respect to member-vs. nonmember banks of the Federal Reserve System. 4 These differential tax effects are important. Equity considerations aside, they artificially r'aise the operating costs of some finns relative to others engaged in essentially the same business activity. This distorts rates of production and the allocation of resources among the differentially taxed firms and lowers the value of output for' given costs.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 imposed uniform reserve requirements on all depository institutions by raising reserve requirements for nonmember banks, while lowering them for member banks. The purpose
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ofthis article is to analyze the effect this legislation has had in eliminating the differential tax effect of interest rate changes on member' vs. nonmember banks. In particular, the paper examines whether the act was effective in revising the response of bank capital values stock prices) to interest rate changes. Since any revision in differences in tax rates between groups generally benefits one group over another, the paper provides some rough estimates of this as well.
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Prior to the Monetary Control Act, reserve requirements for nonmember banks were set by the var'ious state banking authorities. These differed across states with respect to the reserve ratio, the form in which the reserves were required to be held, the method and frequency of policing and the penalty imposed for deficiency.
3 While differences existed, the reserve requirements of state banking authorities generally were more lenient than those ofthe Federal Reserve System. This appears to have been so with respect to the for'm of the reserves, policing and penalties for-deficiency.S pecifically, 30 of the 50 state banking authorities allowed banks to hold at least a portion of their reserves in interest-earning assets, 36 states did not require periodic reporting of reserve and deposit balances and 22 had no monetary penalty for deficient banks.~In contrast, Fed members had to hold reserves either in their vaults or on deposit at a Federal Reserve Bank. These reserve balances earned no interest. Member banks reported their deposit and reserve balances to the Fed on a weekly basis, and a monetary penalty was enforced for deficient banks.
The left side of table 1 gives the reserve requireSee Gilbert and Lovati (1978) , Prestopino (1976) and Knight (1974) .
'See Lovati (1978), p. 32, and Knight (1974) , p. 12-13, for listings of the various state requirements.
'Seven states imposed reserve requirements that were roughly identical to those of Fed members. These states were Arkansas, California, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Utah, Nonmember banks in these states are excluded from the data sample in the tests conducted below. 'Transact'on accounts include at deposits on which trie at.coun 1 t'.otder is perm'cec to make withdrawals by negotiab.e or transferabie uristruments Parent orders at withdrawal. tetephono anc preautnor'zed transfer,' tnt excess or rlree per moltni tar tie purpose ot makinp payments tc third pemsorts or miens 'in general. nonpetsonalt me depos'ts are time deposits. inciuding savIngs deposits ian are not transaction accounts and 'n who 5 the oeneticiai irterest is herd by a depos:tor wh on .s not a natura' person Also .nciudeo are ocean rranstsrab.e t no ceoosits neid by ratumai persons und ocean obligations ;sst.ed to depository instItution offices located r,utside the United States For dwails see section 2042'J' Requidt or; C NOTE Roouired reserves must be heid n (ne torn of deposits w:th Federal P.esen,o Banks or vault cash After rnpiementar'On 0 f the Monetary control Act nonmemnbers may ma:ntain reserves on a pass.through bass with certain approved iist,tutions Other things the same, the more stringent reserve requirements for Fed members raised the cost of maintaining a given level of deposits relative to the cost experienced by nonmembers. Table 2 uses the data in table 1 to calculate the tax for member banks at various levels of net demand deposits-' For example, a member bank with $100 million in net demand deposits was required to hold $11.48 million in reserves.
This resulted in foregone earnings of $918,000 peryear if the market rate were 8 percent." 'the decline in the expected stream of earnings was the reserve tax in this case, $918,000 pci-year).Since the capital value of a firm is the present value of its expected earnings stream, the tax reduced the capital value of the bank as well.
'The Monetary Control Act was passed in March 1980, but the new reserve requirements did not become effective immediately. The right side of the table indicates the reserve requirements that would have been imposed as of November 13, 1 g80, if there had been no phase-in period. In fact, these new requirements were phased in over a period of years (see table 1, note 6). For the moment, the discussion is focused on pre-November 1980 reserve requirements. 'See Gilbert and Lovati (1978) for a listing of the reserve ratios imposed by the various state authorities. 'The calculation is intended for illustrative purposes only and ignores the foregone interest on reserves held against time deposits. 'This represents an upper bound to the tax since the bank would maintain some reserves even if there were no legal requirement to do so.
Not only does the reserve tax reduce the expected earnings str'eams and capital values of member banks those with higher reserve requirements) relative to nonmember banks, but the earnings streams and capital values of member banks change relative to nonmember banks with changes in either the general level of interest rates or the spread between bank borrowing and lending rates. Table 3 illustrates the effect of a change in the level of interest Fates with the spread held constant. In panel A, the late at which banks can lend is assumed to be 10 percent. while the rate paid on deposits land other sources of funds) is 5 percent. The reserve requirement for member banks is assumed to be 10 percent. For illustrative purposes, the non-interestearnings reserves of nonmembers are assumed to be zero. The table calculates the amount available for lending, the annual net revenue and the capital value of the net revenue stream for each $100 of deposits for both a member and a nonmember bank.
The reserve requirement lowers the amount that can be loaned, the stream of net revenue and capital value of the member relative to the nonmember bank. The capital value of the member's revenue stream is $40, while the nonmember's is $50. The member's capital value relative to the nonmember's is 80 per'-cent. Notice that the absolute difference between the two capital values is equal to the required reserves of members ($50 -$40 = $10).
In panel B, both lending and borrowing rates are assumed to increase to 20 percent and 15 percent, respectively, while other things remain the same." The net revenue stream of the nonmember does not change while the member's stream falls. The increase in interest rates causes the capital~àlue of both banks to decline. More importantly, however, the capital value of the membei' bank drops from 80 percent to 60 percent in terms of the capital value of the nonmember bank.
Notice that, in this particular case, the absolute 5 1n the example, the absolute spread is unchanged but the relative spread (it/iL) changes. If the ratio of the borrowing to the tending rate remained constant as the general level of interest rates changed, relative capital values would not change. The example is intended for illustrative purposes. A more precise statement of the effect of interest rate changes is given in the appendix, Conditions of the example are that deposits of both banks are $100 the required reserve ratio for members is 10 percent and zero for nonmembers.
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this variabie did not differ significantly from zero. The proxies for the lending rate used to calculate the spread were the one-month commercial paper rate, the 4-6 month commercial paper rate and In regressions not reported here, the product of a dummy variabie tne 90-day bankers acceptance rate. The borrowing rate proxy was and various proxies 'or ihe spread were tested. The dummy variable the Federai Reserve discount rate. was used to control for the perrod of deposit rate ceiiings that prevailed prior to 1981 rrie dummy variable assumed a value of ' See table 1. note 6. for a discussion of the period over which the new one for the period sirce relaxation of the interest rate ceilings on reaurrements were phaseo in In the text, the phase-in period is deposits (I 1981 -IV 1 983}. arid zero otherwise rho coethcient of ignored unless olherwmse mentioned at each level of net demand deposits, while generally increasing them for nonmember banks. Table I also presents the pre-and post-reserve requirements on time and savings deposits. Before the Monetary Control Act, required reserve holdings against personal and nonpersonal time deposits ranged from I to 6 percent (with a minimum average requirement of 3 percent), while those on savings deposits were a percent. The act reduced these requirements to zero for personal time and savings accounts.
3 Since these deposits represent a substantial portion of total time and savings deposits, this change results in a significant reduction in member bank required reserves. 1 Furthermore, the reserve requirement on managed liabilities and the supplementary reserve requirement on time deposits of $100,000 or more were reduced to zero in July 1980.
While the change in the level of required reserves mandated by the act is clearly important for some issues, what is most important for the purpose of this paper is that this legislation imposes uniform reserve requirements across member and nonmember banks. (See, the insert on page 18 for a discussion of some other provisions of the act.)
The phase-in period for the new reserve requirements, which extended through 1984 for member banks, will not be complete for nonmembers until September 1987. This will mitigate the quantitative effect of the change on the following estimates but the expected qualitative effect should show through."
In an effort to evaluate the implications of the above argument, quarterly data on the share prices and demand deposit liabilities of 40 publicly traded bank holding companies were examined. The holding companies were divided into two categories depending on "See table 1, note 8, for a definition ofpersonal vs. nonpersonal time and savings deposits. 4 For example, for banks in the Eighth Federal Reserve District, the personal portion of savings deposits was more than five times greater than the nonpersonal portion, while the personal portion of time deposits was more than four times the nonpersonal portion.
'"See Pearce and Roley (1983) and (1985) .
whether the subsidiary banks making up an individual holding company were members or nonmembers of the Federal Reserve System.'" The stock prices of each holding company were adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends, and simple quarterly averages of stock prices and demand deposit liabilities were computed for each of the two categories of holding companies. The sample period runs from l/1974-lV/19&3.
The previous arguments imply that the capital values of member relative to nonmember banks will be related in a specific way to certain other variables. Consequently, the variable to be explained (dependent variable) in the following regression is the ratio of the average stock prices of member to nonmember banks. For purposes of the empirical estimate, the dependent variable is expressed in log form.
The following empirical analysis is primarily concerned with the relationship between the dependent variable and the level of interest rates. Since an increase in the level ofinterest rates is thought to reduce member bank capital values relative to those of nonmember banks, the sign of the estimated coefficient on the level of interest rates is expected to be negative. Further, the above arguments indicate that the relationship between these variables will change in a particular way following implementation of the Monetaiy Control Act."' Consequently, an intet-action term is included in the regression as an independent vanable.'"
The interaction term is included to test for the effect that the Monetary Control Act has had in eliminating the differential response of the capital values of members vs. nonmembers to interest rate changes. The interaction term is the product of a coefficient (to be estimated(, a dummy variable and the level of the interest rate. The dummy variable assumes a value of one for the period subsequent to implementation of the Monetary Control Act, while its value is zero during the earlier period. Since the hypothesis suggests that the uniform reserve requirements embodied in the legislation will eliminate the adverse conse-'"The data set includes only state-chartered banks. Nationally chartered banks are required to be members of the Fed, but are excluded from this sample mainly because they are much larger on average than state-chartered banks and are subject to different regulatory agencies.
"'See the appendix for a summary of the theory that underlies the estimating equation. '"The proxy employed for the general level of interest rates is the corporate Aaa bond rate. A long-term interest rate was selected since it is presumed to represent some average of current and expected future shorter-term interest rates.
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Finally, the ratio of member to nonmember demand deposit liabilities is included as a scale variable. The sign of the coefficient on this variable is ambiguous.
However, variation in the size of members relative to nonmembers can affect the dependent variable (see appendix) and, if the regression does not control for this variation, it can contaminate estimates of the other coefficients. Table 5 presents the results of the regression. The variable included to control for differences in the scale of the two types of banks is significant and positive.
For the purposes of this paper, the coefficients on the interest rate and the interaction term are the most interesting. As expected, the coefficient on the interest rate is negative and significant, indicating that a higher interest rate is associated with a lower value of the dependent variable.
The sensitivity of the dependent variable to interest rate changes is measured by its interest rate elasticity. An estimate of the average elasticity during the period prior to the Monetary Control Act is given by the product of the coefficient of the interest rate and its average level 8.7 percent) -In this case, the interest rate elasticity is estimated to be -.48( = .055 )< 8.7). This indicates that a 1 percent increase in the interest rate reduces the share prices of member relative to nonmember banks by about 0.5 percent.
Implementation of the Monetary Control Act appears to have mitigated this differential effect. The sign of the interaction term is positive and significant. The coefficient, however, is less in absolute value than the coefficient of the interest rate. This is not surprising given that the new reserve requirements were phased in and that the phase-in will continue through 1987.
As of this point in the phase-in (IV/1983), and with the average level of interest rates held constant at 8.7 percent, the interest rate elasticity is estimated to be -.30[ = (020 -.055) X 871. This represents a decline of about 40 percent in the interest rate sensitivity of the dependent variable. It is important to recognize that this sensitivity is reduced not only because the sensitivity ofmember bank share prices to interest rate changes declines but also because the legislation, by imposing uniform reserve requirements on all banks, increases the interest rate sensitivity of nonmember bank share prices.
The average level of interest rates rose to about 13 percent subsequent to the Monetary Control Act. Had the act not been in place, the share prices of member relative to nonmember banks would have declined by about 24 percent [= 100 X -48(13.0 -8.7)/8.71. The legislation, however, tempered this to a decline of only 15 percent [= 100 X -.30(13.0 -87)18.71.
The reserve requirements imposed on the deposit liabilities of financial institutions have the properties of a tax. This tax varies with the interest rate and has differential effects across banks depending on their reserve requirements. An important change in this tax was made in the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The act imposed uniform reserve requirements across all financial firms by raising reserve requirements for firms that were not members of the Federal Reserve System, while lowering them for member banks. This paper analyzes the legislation's effect on the relationship between the interest rate and the stock prices of member and nonmember commercial banks. As expected, the legislation has significantly reduced the differential effect of interest rate changes on the relative stock price of these banks. In the process, it has raised the after-tax earnings streams and stock prices of member banks, other things the same, while lowering both for nonmember banks. (1 -is/i,)
Note that i/i must be less than one. An increase in this ratio is consistent with a decline in the spread between lending and borrowing rates. D~1 -
